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Social psychology is interested in how social context influences individuals’ behavior. The prototypical social psychological question related to collective action is that of why some individuals participate in social movements while others do not, or for that matter, why some individuals decide to quit while others stay involved. The social psychological answer to these questions is given in terms of typical psychological processes such as identity, cognition, motivation, and emotion. People—social psychologists never tire of asserting us—live in a perceived world. They respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it and if we want to understand their cognitions, motivations and emotions we need to know their perceptions and interpretations. Hence, social psychology focuses on subjective variables and takes the individual as its unit of analysis. 
	Taking the individual as the unit of analysis has important methodological implications. If one wants to explain individual behavior, one needs to collect data at the individual level: attitudes, beliefs, opinions, motives, affect and emotions, intended and actual behavior, and so on. Face-to-face interviews, survey questionnaires (paper and pencil or online), experiments, registration and observation of individual behavior are the typical devices applied in social psychological research. Whatever the method employed, the point of the matter is that answers, measures and observations must be unequivocally attributable to one and the same individual. This is important because the fundamental methodological principle in social psychological research is the coincidence of two observations in one individual. Such methodological individualism is not to say that people do not interact or identify with groups. Obviously, people are group members and do interact. In fact, group identification and interaction within groups is among the key-factors in any social psychological explanation. It only is a consequence of an approach that takes the individual as the unit of analysis.
	Taking the individual as the unit of analysis has important epistemological implications as well. It implies, inter alia, that questions that take a unit of analysis other than the individual (f.i. a movement, a group, a region, or a country), require other disciplines than social psychology to formulate an answer to that question. Hence, social psychology should fare fine in explaining why individual members of a society participate or fail to participate in a movement once it has emerged, but is not very helpful in explaining why social movements emerge or decline in a society or at a specific point in time. How individual decisions and choices accumulate and result in a more or less successful movement is the subject of other disciplines. The rise and fall of social movements and their impact on politics are topics that take the movement as the unit of analysis. Sociology, political science, and history are better suited for such analyses. Similarly, social psychology should be able to explain why individuals identify with a group, and why strong group identification reinforces someone’s willingness to take part in protest on behalf of that group. However, sociology and especially anthropology are better suited for a study of the collective identity of a group, where the group is the unit of analysis. Finally—to give a last example—social psychology is good in analyzing why specific beliefs and attitudes foster participation in a movement, but the question of how such beliefs and attitudes are distributed in a society is a study object that social geography and sociology are better equipped for.
Taking the individual as the unit of analysis alludes to the limits of structural explanations. Unless all individuals who are in the same structural position display identical behavior, a shared position can never provide sufficient explanation of individual behavior and even if people do display identical behavior the motivational background and the accompanying emotions may still be different. Indeed, this is exactly what a social psychology of protest is about—trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so different. Why feel some ashamed of their situation, while others take a pride in it; why are some aggrieved, while others are not; why do some define their situation as unjust, while others do not; why do some feel powerless, while others feel strong; why are some angry, while others are afraid. This is the kind of questions social psychology students of movement participation seek to answer.
Before we move along, a remark must be made about the assumptions regarding individual behavior that underlie social movement studies. Although anthropology, sociology, political sciences, history, and social geography usually do their analyses at levels different than that of the individual, they do build their reasoning on assumption about individual behavior. These assumptions are not necessarily in sync with state-of-the-art social psychological insights. This is not to say that every social scientist must become a social psychologist first, but it is to say that it is worth the effort to specify the social psychological assumptions that underlie the analyses and to see whether they fit into what social psychologists know these days about individual behavior. 

About this chapter
The principal part of this chapter consists of A Social Psychology of Movement Participation. The first section deals with four fundamental social psychological processes as they are employed in the context of social movement participation: social identity, social cognition, emotions and motivation. Identity, cognition, emotion, and motivation are presented as the processes at the individual level that link collective identity and collective action. We will elaborate on each of these constructs, discuss how they are employed in the study of social movement participation and describe exemplary studies that take them as their explanatory focus. Thereafter we will deal with the phenomenon of social movement participation. We will discuss such matters as what do we mean by movement participation; movement participation within the broader spectrum of the dynamics of contention; short-term versus sustained participation; and the dynamics of disengagement (an often forgotten aspect of the dynamics of movement participation). The chapter closes with a concluding section. In this section we will try to assess where we stand and propose directions to proceed. However, before we start with were we (as social psychologists) are, we will go back to the past.

Back to the past
For a long time social movement scholars outside social psychology tended to equate social psychology to relative deprivation theory, and indeed, relative deprivation is a key concept in any grievance theory. Since Runciman’s (1966) classical study relative deprivation and more specifically fraternalistic relative deprivation has featured in social movement literature as explanation of movement participation. Feelings of relative deprivation result from comparisons of one’s situation with some standard of comparison—be it one’s own past, someone else’s situation, or some cognitive standard (Folger, 1986). If such comparisons result in the conclusion than one is not receiving the rewards or recognition one deserves the feelings that accompany this assessment are referred to as relative deprivation. If the comparison concerns someone’s personal situation Runciman proposed to use the concept of egoistic deprivation. If the comparison concerns the situation of a group someone belongs to he proposed the concept of fraternalistic deprivation. It was assumed that especially fraternalistic relative deprivation is relevant in the context of movement participation (Major, 1994; Martin, 1986).​[1]​ 
However, while fraternalistic deprivation is regarded as the more valid explanation of collective action, the relationship between fraternalistic deprivation and collective action is moderate at best (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983). Indeed, while many minority group members recognize their group’s discrimination, relatively few are involved in collective action (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Thus, the almost singular focus on fraternalistic deprivation does not appear to provide an adequate psychological explanation for collective action (Foster & Matheson, 1999). Foster and Matheson argue that an expanded understanding of the role of perceived relative deprivation may be gained from alternative theories of group behavior, namely theories of group consciousness raising (e.g. Stanley & Wise, 1983), which suggest that individuals act to benefit their group once they acknowledge that “the personal is political”.
In order to capture the connection between individual (personal) and group (political) oppression it may be informative to consider the much ignored notion of double relative deprivation (Foster & Matheson, 1999), the perception of both personal and group deprivation (Runciman, 1966). It is suggested that people who feel both egoistic deprivation and fraternalistic deprivation may report a qualitatively different experience that may be more strongly associated with action-taking than the experience of either egoistic or fraternalistic deprivation alone. Foster and Matheson (1999) show that when the group experience becomes relevant for ones own experience, there is a greater motivation to take part in collective action. 
	Akin to relative deprivation theory but featuring less prominent in social movement literature has been frustration-aggression theory (Berkowitz, 1972). The idea is that when the achievement of some goal is blocked by some external agency, this results in feelings of frustration. Among the possible reactions to such feelings of frustration are acts aiming at the external agency in order to lift the blockade or simply punish the agency for blocking goal achievement. Being a general theory about human behavior the frustration-aggression framework has been applied in the context of movement participation and political protest as well (Berkowitz, 1972; see for a review of the literature on union participation Klandermans, 1986).
	Both relative deprivation theory and frustration-aggression theory are examples of grievance theories. In an attempt to develop a more systematic grievance theory Klandermans (1997) distinguished between illegitimate inequality, suddenly imposed grievances, and violated principles. Illegitimate inequality is what relative deprivation theory is about. The assessment of illegitimate inequality implies both comparison processes and legitimating processes. The first processes concern the assessment of a treatment as unequal, the second of that inequality as illegitimate. Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat or inroad upon people’s rights or circumstances (Walsh, 1981). The third type of grievances refers to moral outrage because it is felt that important values or principles are violated. We can find each of these kinds of grievances embodied in various movements. The women’s movement, for example, attempts to redress years of unequal treatment in society; the toxic waste movement is a response to suddenly imposed grievance and the pro-life movement is a reaction to what its participants see as a violation of a moral principle, the commandment “Thou shall not kill”. Klandermans takes the three types or grievances together as feelings of injustice, that he defines as “outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem” (p. 38). 
	Since the appearance of resource mobilization theory grievance theories lost the attention of many a movement scholar. Grievance theories were associated with so called ‘breakdown theories’, which were discredited for portraying social movements and movement participation as irrational responses to structural strain. Moreover, the resource mobilization approach took as its point of departure that grievances abound and that the question to be answered was not so much why people are aggrieved but why aggrieved people mobilize. As a consequence the social movement field lost its interest in grievance theory and because of the association of grievance theory with social psychology it lost its interest in social psychology as well. Klandermans (1984) was among the first to observe that in so doing it had thrown the baby out with the bathwater. He began to systematically explore and disseminate what social psychology has to offer to students of social movements. He demonstrated that grievances are necessary but certainly not sufficient conditions for participation in social movements and proposed social psychological mechanisms that do add sufficient explanation. He argued and demonstrated that there is much more available in social psychology than relative deprivation. His example was followed by a small but growing number of social psychologists that have gradually expanded Klandermans’ models. This chapter takes stock of what they accomplished so far; of what we have and where we are today. 

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION





Acting collectively requires some collective identity. Sociologists were among the first to emphasize the importance of collective identity in collective action participation. They argued that the generation of a collective identity is crucial for a movement to emerge (Melucci, 1989; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). Collective identity is conceived as an emergent phenomenon. In the words of Melucci, “Collective identity is an interactive, shared definition produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups” (Melucci, 1995). 
Individuals engage in collective action, “any time that they are acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (Wright, 2001). As social psychologists we must emphasize that it are individuals who construct collective identity and that it are individuals who stage collective action. Individuals, however, live in a perceived reality. In the end, it is individuals who react to their social environment as they perceive it and who are motivated (or not) to take part in collective action. Social psychologists have proposed four fundamental mechanisms to explain the relationship between collective identity and collective action participation, namely, social identity, social cognition, emotion and motivation. In practice, these concepts are thoroughly interwoven resulting in a motivational constellation, but the distinction is useful analytically. In Figure 1 they are depicted in the inner square (d). 
Identification with the group involved appears to be a strong predictor of collective action participation (de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Haslam, 2001; Hercus, 1999; Kelly, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003). Besides the direct effects of group identification on collective action, group identification also indirectly influences collective action participation through its impact on social identity, cognition, emotions and motivation. Depersonalization of the self is the fundamental process that determines this indirect link: “Through depersonalization self-categorization effectively brings self-perception and behavior into line with the contextually relevant in-group prototype, and thus transforms individuals into group members and individuality into group behavior” (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995: 261). Individuals think, act and feel like group members because they incorporate elements of a collective identity into their social identity. The mechanism in between is group identification. The black arrow (c) between collective identity and the small square in Figure 1 reflects the role of group identification. Group identification influences what people feel, think and do. Collective identity, however, is also shaped by what people feel, think and do with regard to the collective. Therefore, the arrow points in both directions. 
What makes the proposed social psychological mechanisms all pointing in the direction of a readiness for action? Indeed, group identification makes people having ideas, feelings, and interests similar to others, yet this does not necessarily imply a readiness for action. Group members have to experience a growing consciousness of shared grievances and a clear idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances. Consciousness refers to a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of this awareness of similarity (Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980: 30). It involves correct identification in one’s group or category and the location of that group in the structure, as well as a recognition that one’s group’s interests are opposed to those of other groups. Tajfel (1974, cited by Gurin et al., 1980)) stresses that the transformation of social categorization into a more developed state of consciousness is enhanced by conflict and structural factors. In his view, people will engage in a number of cognitive reinterpretations that provide the critical components of consciousness if mobility out of a socially devalued category is structurally constrained. This brings us to the context were the collective struggle is fought out.
All the processes depicted in Figure 1 do not operate in a social vacuum. Contrary to that, collective identities are created and constructed in a social and political context and group interests and values are defended in inter group situations (see (a) Figure 1). Indeed, although the emphasis in social psychology is on the individual level, the dynamics of collective action participation do take place in a social and political context. As Klandermans (1997) states: “Movement organizations, multiorganizational fields, political opportunities, and social and cultural cleavages affect the route that individual participants take towards or away from the movement”. The collective struggle is, by definition, fought out in the social or political intergroup context. Figure 1 can be read as if one of these group processes is placed under a magnify class, obviously, these processes take place in a wider social, cultural and political context. Thus, although we acknowledge the influence of this wider context, we will focus on the more social psychological mechanisms in the sections to come. 

Figure 1 is so much as the roadmap for the sections to come. We will elaborate on the separate constructs as they feature in social psychological research on movement participation and describe exemplary research taking these constructs as the key explanatory factors. 

Group identification
Group identification seems to be the fundamental social psychological answer to the question of what drives people to engage in collective action. Identification with the group involved seems a powerful reason to participate in protest on behalf of that group, be it identification with women or workers (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Kelly & Kelly, 1994), the elderly or gay (Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a, 2004b; Stürmer et al., 2003) farmers (Klandermans, Sabucedo, & Rodriguez, 2004; Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez, & de Weerd, 2002; de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999), former East Germans (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999), feminists (Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004) or obese (Stürmer et al., 2003). These studies report consistently that group identification and collective action participation are correlated. They report moderately positive correlations between the two variables, roughly between .20 and .30: the more people identify with the group involved, the more they are motivated to participate in collective action. This relation proved meta-analytically also to be an important relation (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2006). Apparently, identification with a group is an important reason why people participate in protest on behalf of that group. In order to understand why, we need to elaborate the concept of identity. 

Identity
The clearest definition of social identity that has been located in the social psychological literature is presented by Tajfel. According to Tajfel (1978b: 63) identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. The concept, thus, contains a cognitive (awareness of membership), an evaluative (the values associated with the membership), and an emotional/affective (feelings towards one’s group membership as well as others standing in relation to the group) element (see Tajfel, 1978a). Identity is our understanding of who we are and of who other people are, and, reciprocally other people’s understanding of themselves and others (Jenkins, 2004). Hence, the notion of identity involves two criteria of comparison between people: sameness and difference ness. This made Simon (1999) define identity succinctly as a place in the social world. Important, though, identity is not a given fact, identity is a practical accomplishment, a process. Identifying ourselves or others is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, communication and negotiation (Jenkins, 2004). 
At the psychological heart of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) lays the assumption that people strive for a positive self-evaluation (Turner, 1999: 8). This self-evaluation concerns two components: personal and social identity. Personal identity refers to self-definition in terms of personal attributes, whereas social identity refers to self-definition in terms of social category memberships. Social identity is seen as a cognitive entity; that is to say, if social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, then people see themselves less as unique individuals and more as the prototypical representatives of their ingroup category. Indeed, people are inclined to define their personal self in terms of what makes them different from others, whereas they tend to define their social identities in terms of what makes them similar to others. In other words, it is the cognitive transition from an “I” into a “we” as a locus of self-definition that transforms personal identity into collective identity. When social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, people think, feel and act as members of their group (Turner, 1999). In their striving for a positive self-evaluation it is important that the membership of groups has a positive influence on one’s self-evaluation. Therefore people want to be members of high status groups. 
Because people strive for a positive self-evaluation, membership of a low group status spurs them to undertake action in order to acquire a higher group status by leaving the group or changing its status. Tajfel and Turner (1979) formulate social structural characteristics controlling intergroup behavior. The first characteristic is permeability of the group boundaries, that is, the possibilities perceived by the individual to attain membership of a higher status group. When people see membership of a higher status group as a possibility, they will try to leave the lower status group. As a consequence, their commitment to the lower status group declines. The second characteristic is stability. Stability refers the extent to which status positions are stable or variable. People who conceive of status positions as variable, perceive collective action as a possible strategy to realize higher group status. Which implies that they are inclined to participate in collective action on behalf of the group. Such inclination will be fostered when the low group status is perceived as illegitimate. To sum up, according to social identity theory, people will participate in collective action to improve group status if they are not able to leave the group, if they believe that this status position is variable and when the low status is perceived as illegitimate.

Group identification: the link between collective and social identity
Acting collectively requires some collective identity or consciousness (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). Although collective identity and social identity are related concepts, they refer to different aspects of group life. Collective identity concerns cognitions shared by members of a single group (Taylor & Whittier, 1992), whereas social identity concerns cognitions of a single individual about his or her membership in one or more groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group identification forms the link between collective and social identity. Group identification can be seen as a product of self-categorization—a cognitive representation of the self as a representative of a more inclusive category (Brewer & Silver, 2000). This cognitive representation is accompanied by an awareness of similarity, ingroup identity and shared fate with others who belong to the same category. Polletta and Jasper (2001), however, emphasizes that group identification is more than a cognitive process, in his own words, “a collective identity is not simply the drawing of a cognitive boundary […] most of all, it is an emotion” (p. 415). It is difficult to imagine that an identity is purely cognitive yet strongly held. The “strength” of an identity comes from its affective component. Thus where self-categorization theory emphasizes the cognitive side of identification Jasper reminds us of the more affective side of group identification (see Ellemers, 1993 for a similar argument).
Self-categorization theory proposes that people are more prepared to employ a social category in their social identity the more they identify with that category. Thus, the stronger the group identification, the more the shared beliefs and fate comprised in the group’s collective identity are incorporated in the individual’s social identity. However, individuals do not incorporate the complete picture but rather a selection of what a collective identity encompasses. These idiosyncratic remakes of collective beliefs at the individual level create a variety in the content of the social identity. Indeed, not all farmers, obese, workers, women, feminists or gays have identical social identities, yet they do feel like farmers, obese, and so on.
A group’s collective identity can be studied in its own right by examining such phenomena as the group’s symbols, rituals, beliefs and the values its members share. An individual’s identification with a group can be studied in its own right as well by examining the individual’s beliefs, sentiments, commitment to the group, use of symbols, participation in rituals and so on. Thus, group identification can be assessed in all kinds of ways, but any operationalization of group identification will refer somehow to what it means to an individual to belong to the group in point and will thus implicitly or explicitly refer to the pride of being a member of the group, to the symbols, the values, the fate shared by the group members. Therefore group identification is akin to commitment to the group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Goslinga, 2002). Huddy (2001) argues that it is not group identification per se but the strength of such identification that influences group members’ readiness to view themselves and act in terms of their group membership. Huddy (2001) criticizes social identity literature for neglecting the fact that real-world identities vary in strength; identifying more or less strongly with a group, she argues, may make a real difference, especially in political contexts. Related to this point is the fact that identity strength is related to identity choice (Huddy, 2003). Huddy distinguishes between ascribed and acquired group membership, ascribed identities are “quite difficult to change, and acquired identities are adopted by choice” (p. 536). Group identification tends to increase in strength when it is voluntary. Membership of a social movement organization can be seen as a prototypical example of a voluntary acquired, hence strong, identity. 
De Weerd & Klandermans (1999) broke group identification down into an affective and a behavioral component. The affective component refers to the degree of attachment to the group (farmers in this study) or category and the behavioral component refers to membership in identity organizations (being a member of a farmers’ organization). In a longitudinal study they investigated the causal relation between the affective and behavioral identity component and collective action participation. It should not come as a surprise anymore that identification with farmers stimulated collective action participation. While both the affective and the behavioral component impacted on people's willingness to participate in political protest, only the behavioral component stimulated actual participation directly. According to de Weerd and Klandermans that makes sense: “Being organized implies communication networks, access to resources, interpersonal control, information about opportunities when, where and how to act, and all those other things that make it more likely that intentions materialize” (p. 1092). 
The opposite assumption, that participation strengthens group identification, was confirmed for behavioral but not affective identification. These findings suggest that at least in the case of behavioral identification causality between identification and action participation goes in both directions (Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez, & de Weerd, 2002).
It remains a question why people who participated in collective action are more inclined to participate in farmers’ organizations than people who did not participate. A possible answer might be that actual participation enhances feelings of belonging, collective empowerment (Drury et al., 2005; Drury & Reicher, 1999) or makes the shared grievances or claims more transparent. In other words, actual participating influences which aspects of collective identity are appropriated. Indeed, although this study can be seen as an important first step in investigating the dynamic interaction between group identification and collective action participation a whole lot of questions remain unanswered. 

Salience
The fact that people have many collective identities raises the question of why some collective identity become central to mobilization while others do not. People have many identities that remain latent most of the time. Self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) hypothesizes that depending on contextual circumstances the transition from an “I” to a “we” as locus of self-definition occurs. A particular identity is said to be salient if it is “functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behavior” (Turner et al., 1987: 118). Salience is context dependent (Turner, 1999). What makes a dormant identity salient and spurs action on behalf of that identity? Besides contextual factors and direct reminders, the presence of other ingroup members can be a potent reminder of someone’s social identity, the more so if the members are aiming at a common goal. The presence of an outgroup will also remind people of their ingroup identity. Another effective prompt is being treated as a member of a minority. Although all these reminders can make a social identity salient, probably the most powerful factor that brings group membership to mind is conflict or rivalry between groups. 
The social identity approach suggests that salient social identity spurs several social-psychological processes that facilitate group-serving behavior. For example, when group members define themselves in terms of their collective identity, they focus on the similarities between themselves and fellow ingroup members with references to experiences, needs, interests or goals. As a result, “my” experiences and “your” experiences, needs and so forth are transformed into “our” experiences and needs. The perception of shared problems or grievances, or of interchangeable needs, goals and interests, is an important first step toward politicization of a group’s collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Identity: where do we stand and how to proceed
Foregoing demonstrated the role of identity in spurring collective action participation. Indeed, collective action is contingent upon seeing the self as part of a group, while acting collectively requires some collective identity or consciousness (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). It shows that the role of identification in spurring collective action participation is not simply a matter of an on/off switch. Indeed, the influence of identity strength, identity salience, and identity changes over time, reveal that the role of identity on collective action participation is dynamic and multifaceted. 
However, there remains a lot to be explained regarding the role of identity in the context of movement participation. To be sure the basics are clear, but so far we have emphasized the direct effects of identification on collective action participation, but through its influence on values, interests, and emotions identification may also have an indirect effect on collective action participation (Hogg et al., 1995). The stronger someone’s group identification, the more shared beliefs, grievances, emotions and fate comprised in the group’s collective identity are incorporated in the individual’s social identity. These indirect effects of group identification on participation are far from understood. Moreover, people have multiple social identities that can reinforce or work against each other in motivating people to take the streets. Furthermore, to allude to yet another unsolved issues, little is known about the relation between collective identity and the idiosyncratic remake of this into someone’s social identity. Indeed, more systematic research into the role of collective identity.

Cognition
As mentioned previously, people engage in collective action “any time that they are acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (Wright, 2001). This definition obviously refers to cognition as it implies that people know about the conditions of their group. Certainly, the political arena is a domain in which cognitions and the cognition formation are important phenomena. The social psychological study of how people make sense of the social world, or more precisely, of the way in which they interpret, analyze, store, and use information about the social and political world might shed light on how cognition and cognition formation are linked to collective action. Particularly, “because social cognition emphasizes the cognitive processes that mediate between environmental stimuli and interpersonal responses and […] links cognition to action” (Carlston, 2001, p 2). Take for example the process of politicization of collective identity as conceptualized by Simon & Klandermans (2001). According to the authors, the process begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group’s predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this opponent. Group members’ perception that they share grievances is an important first step toward collective social and political action. These emphases make clear that there is an important cognitive component (in addition to a motivational and an emotional component) in how people react to their social and political environment. 
For more than two decades, social cognition and social psychology were almost synonyms, reflecting how the discipline was transformed by the cognitive revolution (Mischel, 1998). The cognitive revolution has had a strong impact on political psychology as well (McGraw, 2000). The cognitive approach in political psychology is characterized by the deceptively simple premise that information about the outside political world is organized in internal memory structures, and that these memory structures determine how people interpret and evaluate political events and make political decisions (McGraw, 2000). 
Despite the pervasive influence of cognition within social and political psychology, remarkable little is known about how cognition translates into collective action participation. Indeed, there is an abundance of cognitive approaches to voting behavior and leadership representation (see McGraw, 2000 for an overview) but collective action participation got a raw deal. To be sure, people’s cognitions regarding their social environment were often―direct or indirect―subject of investigation of students of protest. Moral shocks (Jasper, 1997), suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh, 1981), frame alignment (Benford & Snow, 2000), relative deprivation (Kawakami & Dion, 1993), social construction of reality (Gamson, 1992), political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) and justice judgments (Tyler & Smith, 1998), to only give a few examples, are all cognitive concepts shown to be related to engagement in collective action. However, what people know of social and political situations (the content) cannot be easily separated from how they process information (the cognitive process, Shweder & Bourne, 1984). The processes of interpreting, analyzing, storing, and using information in the context of movement participation are understudied. Cognitive and social psychological information processing approaches, as we hope to be able to show, may introduce new methodologies and new theories to investigate information processing in the context of collective action participation. 

Reality construction
How do individuals make sense of their complex social environment? What are the underlying mechanisms that determine our understanding of the social world? And how does this understanding relate to action, specifically, collective action? Social cognition literature―the study of the cognitive processes that are involved when we think about the social world―attempts to answer these questions. 
What kind of information do people pay attention to? When does political discourse raise enough above the abundance of messages for people to be noticed? Three broad types of information are identified that may be of special concern to people as they form opinions about their social and political environment: (1) the material interests that people see at stake, (2) the sympathies and resentments that people feel toward groups, and (3) commitment to the political principles that become entangled in public issues (Sears & Funk, 1991; Taber, 2003). Previous research also showed that attention is automatically allocated to negative information or information inconsistent with existing schemata (Stangor & Ruble, 1989), unexpected events (Wyer & Srull, 1986), or information that activates the (social) self (e.g. Bargh, 1994). Moreover, people tend to base their inferences on information from people they trust, interpersonal trust creates an information shortcut (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). So far these findings are not related to collective action participation. However, we may assume that individuals who interpret information from people they trust as having more unexpected negative consequences for their personal or social self either because their material interests are at stake or because it is against their principles, are more inclined to take to the streets.
Cognitive misers. Individuals are ‘cognitive misers’ (Wyer & Srull, 1986), that is, they are seen as having limited processing capacity with which to deal with an infinitely complex and ever-changing environment. They must therefore make the best possible use of these resources and treat them in a miserly manner. Consider for instance the following cognitive constructs and information-processing heuristics: individuals utilize mental shortcuts that reduce the amount of cognitive energy used in decision-making: heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). An example of a heuristic is majority rules, in other words, individuals confronted with uncertainty will seek fast and frugal group decision heuristics. A simple majority rule qualifies as such a fast and frugal heuristic. Another cognitive energy saving device is a prototype, that is an abstract mental representations of the central tendency of members of a category (Cantor & Mischel, 1977). When people shift from their personal to their social self, self-perception and behavior are effectively brought into line with the contextually relevant in-group prototype. Thus, just relying on the cognitive prototype of the relevant ingroup makes people feel, think and do as group members. How events go by is cognitively represented by scripts, or event schemas (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Activists, for instance, will have a highly accessible script on how demonstrations go by. The last example of cognitive structures, represents a person’s knowledge about an object, person, or situation, including knowledge about attributes and relationships among those attributes, or so called schemata (Rumelhart, 1980). Justice scholars, for example, were wondering whether individuals have justice schemata (Tyler, 1994). If so, it would be interesting to investigate whether individuals with highly elaborated justice schemata are more inclined to participate in collective action than those without. 
More recently, the cognitive miser metaphor has been stretched even further in the literature on automaticity (Bargh, 1994). In this literature thought and judgment are viewed as being beyond conscious control. Automatic cognitions are determined and shaped by dominant expectations, schemas, and scripts. However, “one rarely sees explicit mention of automaticity [in political psychology]” (Taber, 2003: 462). Indeed, investigation of political information processing and accordingly political behavior may take a leap forward by taking automatic processes into account.
Dual process models. These different processes refer also to a longstanding distinction drawn by psychologists between two distinct ways of information-processing—so called dual process models. The one process concerns the unconscious learning of regularities, whereas the other concerns the assessment of unique or novel events (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
Examples of such models abound: the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM, Chaiken, 1980); the Elaboration Likehood Model (ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), experiential versus rational thinking (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), reflective and impulsive processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), associative and rule-based processes (Sloman, 1996, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000 for an extensive overview and conceptual integration of dual process models in social and cognitive psychology). Moore and Loewenstein (2004), for example, found that self-interest and concern for others influence behavior through different cognitive systems. Self-interest is automatic, viscerally compelling, and often unconscious, while understanding one’s ethical obligations to others involves a more thoughtful process. Take, for example, Omoto and Snyders (1995) distinction between more self-focused and other-focused motivations in their studies of types of motivations of AIDS volunteers (buddies). Indeed, dual-process models may generate new insights into how information processing influences motivational constellation and how it translates collective action participation.
Cognitive ability. Characterizing social cognition as learning what matters in the social world highlights the fact that social-cognitive principles exist because they are adaptive, even necessary, for human survival. They provide essential benefits to self-regulation and social regulation. But this is not the whole story, The principles come with costs by producing errors and biases in memory, judgments and decision-making (Higgins, 2000). Taber (2003) relates these costs and benefits to information processing and political opinion and concludes that “there is little question that people use heuristics to simplify their information processing; there is considerable question that such short-cuts allow them to behave competently” (p. 459). Taber is one of those scholars who conclude that human beings are incapable of analytically interpreting, analyzing, storing, and using political information, and instead rely on a variety of heuristics, which reduce their competence. These scholars depart from the notion that people are cognitive misers. But specifically in relation to complex social and political information it is the ambiguity or shortage of information rather than an abundance which makes it hard to get an idea of what is going on or who is to be blamed. Indeed, social reality is seldom sufficiently transparent to arrive at one single interpretation. 
However, despite these difficulties some authors hold that people are very well capable of conducting political debates and employing political cognition. These authors reason that opinion formation is not only a result of employing individual heuristics to interpret, store and remember social and political information, but that people are constantly and actively engaged in a complex and socially situated process of reality construction. Gamson (1992) is an example of the latter from the field of movement studies. He wonders how it is that so many people become active in social movements if people are so generally uninterested and badly informed about (political and social) issues. Gamson designed a study to explore the construction of political understanding and how that may or may not support participation in collective action. Gamson conceives of reality construction as a socially situated process therefore he collected data created in a socially situated setting: focus group interviews. Gamson reports the results of a study of conversations conducted within various social networks. He asked groups of friends and acquaintances to discuss such issues the Israeli-Arab conflict and affirmative action. One of his most interesting findings was that in these conversations people use any kind of information source available: newspapers, movies, advertisements, novels, rumor, their own and other experiences and so on. He claims that a mix of experiential knowledge, popular knowledge and media discourse develop into so-called collective action frames. In Gamson’s words (1992) a collective action frame is “a set of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns” (p. 7). They are comprised of three components, injustice, agency, and identity. The injustice component refers to moral indignation. It is not just a cognitive judgment, but also one that is laden with emotion (i.e. a hot cognition). The agency component refers to the awareness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action. The identity component refers to the process of defining a “we” and some “they” that have opposing interests and values. Combination of the datasets revealed that media discourse provides information about who is to be blamed for the situation. Experiential knowledge helped to connect the abstract cognition of unfairness with the emotion of moral indignation. Gamson has pioneered new approaches to the study of political understanding, developing new conceptual and methodological tools for thinking about how groups actually formulate political understandings. Instead of treating media content as a stimulus that leads to some change in attitude or cognition, it is treated as an important tool or resource that people in conversation have available, next to popular wisdom, and experiential knowledge. 

Cognition: where do we stand and how to proceed
The study by Gamson addresses the construction of social reality and how this translates into collective action which makes it an important contribution to the social psychology of protest. It emphasizes both individual and social aspects of cognition in relation to collective action. However, this study mainly takes the content, in other words what people know about their social reality, as its starting point. Which leaves a lot of questions addressing the cognitive process in relation to collective action unanswered. These cognitive processes and how they relate to collective action participation are understudied. 
The traditional information-processing approach focused on the individual, assuming that cognition was something that concerns the individual brain. However, it is more and more recognized that cognition forms within social groups, rather than individual brains (e.g. Gamson, 1992; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Taber, 2003). Indeed, people acquire “shared cognitions”. How do people come to share information, who do they trust as a source of information and who not? Individual members of a collectivity incorporate a smaller or larger proportion of the views supported by “their” organization; but there is an abundance of frames in our social and political environment, so why would people adopt certain frames while neglecting or paying less attention to others? The challenge for collective action scholars will be to account for the social influence on individual cognition formation. Indeed, because the cognitive approach rests on methodological individualism (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998) it ignores the fact that many psychological processes are the result of commitment with a given group. Social networks, for example, intervene by shaping the individual preferences or perceptions that form the decision making process and bring potential activists to collective action (Passy, 2003). Moreover, social comparison theory tells us that “an opinion, a belief, an attitude is ‘correct’, ‘valid’, and ‘proper’ to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar believes, opinions, and attitudes” (Festinger, 1950: 272). In addition, social identification processes underlie the general finding that persuasive messages from ingroup sources are more effective than messages an outgroup source (Brewer & Silver, 2000). Their also appears to be a clear link between the development of shared cognition and shared identity in that a social identity can be both the product of, and precursor to, the development of shared cognition (Swaab, Postmes, Van Beest, & Spears, in press). Finally, consensus formation is also the result of an interpretation process and personal networks strongly influence this interpretation process (Klandermans, 1988). Potential adherents of social movements “attribute meanings to events and interpret situations” before they decide to join a social movement organization and engage in collective action (Klandermans, 1992: 77). Indeed, socially structured cognition is a new and inviting field in relation to collective action, which is a social phenomenon by nature. 
	Another theme that requires a whole lot more insight is the formation and role of grievances. Why are people aggrieved about the one state of affair and not about the other, and why are some grievances the beginning of a mass movement while others never become a reason to mobilize. Also the relationship between grievances and emotions is yet to be specified. It is obvious that grievances evoke emotions, but which emotions and how and why is unclear.

Emotions
Politics—and especially politics of protest—are full of emotions. People are fearful about terrorism, angry about proposed budget cuts, shocked about senseless violence, and proud about their national identity. Clearly, there is an emotional component in how people react to their social and political environment. Yet, amazingly little is known about where emotions exactly fit into the context of movement participation. In collective action research emotions are a novice with a long history. In the first half of the previous century, emotions were at the centre of collective action studies. Collective action was seen as an irrational response to discontent and emotions were equated with irrationality. As a reaction to these approaches, the dominant academic analyses on collective action participation shifted to rationalistic, structural and organizational explanations. Such phenomena as moral shocks (Jasper, 1997) or suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh, 1981) were primarily approached from a cognitive point of view whereas few researchers paid attention to the complex emotional processes that channel fear and anger into moral indignation and political activity. Frame alignment is yet another example of an approach that deals entirely with the cognitive components (but for an exception see (but for an exception see Robnett, 2004; Schrock, Holden, & Reid, 2004). As a result, emotions as they accompany protest were neglected altogether. The rational trend has now been reversed and we see emotions back on the research agenda of collective action scholars (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polleta, 2001; 2004; Jasper, 1997, 1998; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). 
To understand engagement in collective action, one must understand emotionswhat they are, how they work, and how they interact with motivation, identification and cognition. Over the past several decades, emotions have become an important topic for research in social psychology. Some of this research concerns the nature of emotion itself: types of emotions, their causes, and their properties. Other research concerns how emotions influence social phenomena: their effects on thought and behavior, their social functions. Importing social psychological expertise on emotions in the sociology-dominated field of collective action may help to understand the role of emotions in protest behavior. 
The purpose of this section is to provide some background for the study of emotion and its importance in collective action. We will explain why emotions and protest are inextricable phenomena and summarize social psychological emotion theories and research on emotions that―in our view―might be of help by explaining protest behavior, and describe some exemplary studies of the influence of emotions on the dynamics of protest.

Emotions and protest
Emotions permeate protest at all stages: recruitment, sustained participation and dropping out (Jasper, 1998). Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta.(2001: 13) argue that “emotions are socially constructed, but that “some emotions are more [socially] constructed than others, involving more cognitive processes”. In their view, emotions that are politically relevant are more than other emotions at the social construction end of the scale. For these emotions, cultural and historical factors play an important role in the interpretation (i.e. perception) of the state of affairs by which they are generated. Emotions, these authors hold, are important in the growth and unfolding of social movement and political protest. Obviously, emotions can be manipulated. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package of attitudes. Also in the ongoing activities of the movements do emotions play an important role (Jasper, 1997, 1998). Anger and indignation are emotions that are related to a specific appraisal of the situation. At the same time, people might be puzzled by some aspects of reality and try to understand what is going on. They may look for others with similar experiences and a social movement may provide an environment to exchange experiences, to tell their stories and to express their feelings.

Social psychological perspectives on emotion
The study of emotions has become a popular research area in social psychology. Such was not always the case. As rational approaches were the state of the art, emotions were often regarded as some peripheral “error term” in motivational theories. But emotion states and there influence on motivation were not about to be so easily explained away. Indeed, emotions have the power to override even the most rational decisions. Several strands of emotion theories were developed since then.
Valence theories of emotions. According to valence theories, emotions are the means by which living creatures are motivated to “approach” and “avoid” (Marcus, 2003). However, while it is certainly the case that we all can readily respond to instructions to classify our perceptions into binary oppositions, such as liking/disliking, good/bad, or warm/cold that does not mean that emotional experiences are fully and adequately captured by such a reduction in presumptive structure. Despite this conceptual problem the methodology of binary oppositions is widely practiced in, for instance, semantic differentials and feeling thermometers. 
Two-dimensional theories. The two dimensional theories of emotions are an improvement over the one-dimension theories in the sense that emotions are not only characterized by approach/avoidance tendencies but by the level of arousal as well. To account for both approach and avoidance and arousal two-dimensional theories propose that emotions fall in a circular order around the perimeter of the space defined by a bipolar valence dimension (pleasantness versus unpleasantness) and an orthogonal dimension labeled activation or arousal (low versus high arousal). These two dimensions define a circumplex, that is, a model in which emotion descriptors can be systematically arranged around the perimeter of a circle (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). Although there is an infinite set of possibilities to label the two dimensions, two competing dimensional theories of emotion emerged in social psychology. One is associated with Russell and colleagues (Russell, 1980) labeling the dimensions respectively low versus high arousal and unpleasant versus pleasant emotions and the other with Watson and collaborators (Watson & Tellegen, 1985) labeling the dimensions respectively low versus high negative affect and low versus high positive affect. 
Underlying adaptive systems theories of emotions. These theories all incorporate the idea that two (adaptive) systems are core elements in the regulation of behavior. One system deals with appetitive motivation and approach behavior, the other system deals with aversive motivation and avoidance behavior. According to these theories the vast majority of emotional experiences derive from the same two motives or action tendencies (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000). Much discussion of this link focuses on two aspects of it: the first is that emotions motivate, they prod people to act. The second is that specific emotions prompt actions that have different aims, aims relevant to the particular emotion being experienced. Several relatively distinct theoretical and empirical streams reach a surprising degree of consensus (see Carver et al., 2000 for an overview) regarding approach and avoidance processes underlying two kinds of self-regulation, and that these two kinds of self-regulation are paralleled by distinct feeling qualities. A few examples are, the behavioral activation system―BAS―and the behavioral inhibition system―BIS―(Gray, 1990), promotion self-regulation and prevention self-regulation (Higgins, 1997) and appetitive and aversive motivational systems (Lang, 1995). 
Marcus and colleagues translated this line of thought into political psychology with the theory of affective intelligence that describes the role of emotions in the making of political judgments (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). They believe that emotional responses to political candidates cannot be modelled simply by attaching an affective tag to cognition, they assume that emotions are the result of a dual process: a behavioral inhibition system (i.e. a surveillance system) and a behavioral approach system (i.e. a dispositional system, Marcus & MacKuen, 1993).
The theory of affective intelligence adopts a dynamic view of judgment and, further, argues that anxiety is the particular emotion that shifts people from one mode of judgment to the other (and back). When anxiety is low, the disposition system allows people to rely on existing “heuristics” or “predispositions” because low anxiety signals that the environment is safe, familiar, and predictable. On the other hand, when anxiety is high—signaling that the environment is in some fashion uncertain and unsettled—reliance on prior learning with its presumption of predictable continuity would not be a strategically sound course. In such situations, it would likely be potentially dangerous to ignore contemporary information and to rely thoughtlessly on preexisting courses of action. In these environments, the surveillance system pushes people to eschew reliance on existing predispositions, turn to consideration of contemporary information, and make a judgment. 
Marcus et al. (2000) tested these effects using evaluation of political candidates and National Election Studies data. Political candidates generate emotions, and in conditions where anxiety is generated, learning is enhanced. Enthusiasm, on the other hand, does not lead to greater learning or make individuals more careful in processing information. The authors did find, however, that enthusiasm led to greater campaign involvement. It would be worthwhile to investigate under what conditions anxiety or enthusiasm lead to political collective action participation. Indeed, this dual system of emotion approach suggest a more complex set of relationships, with different emotion systems having different impacts not only on the expression of feelings but on various aspects of cognition and behavior (Marcus, 2003).
Discrete theories of emotions. Discrete theories of emotion attribute emotion to the application of multiple cognitive evaluations. It is the personal meaning we give to ambiguous stimuli through appraisals that determines emotions we feel. People are continuously evaluating or “appraising” the relevance of their environment for their well being and appraisals help account for different emotions (Arnold, 1960). Lazarus proposed the distinction between “primary appraisal” of an event’s implications for one’s well-being and “secondary appraisal” of one’s ability to cope with the situation (Lazarus, 1966). After a fast and automatic evaluation of the first two appraisal dimensions that establishes the impact of the event on the person’s general well being, the other appraisal dimensions are evaluated: How does the event influence my goals? Who or what caused the event? Do I have control and power over the consequences of the event? Are the consequences of the event compatible with my personal values and (societal) norms? Two persons can thus appraise the same event differently and have different emotional responses. 
A growing body of appraisal theories of emotions has emerged, each specifying a set of appraisal dimensions in an attempt to better predict the elicitation and differentiation of emotions see (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996) for a theoretical overview and integration). Nerb and Spada (2001) conducted three experimental studies to investigate the relation between the cognitive appraisal of environmental problems, the development of distinct emotions (anger and sadness), and the resulting action tendencies. The participants in their studies read a fictitious but realistic newspaper report about an environmental problem (a tanker running aground in a severe storm and spilling oil into the North Sea). Different experimental conditions were realized: (a) the tanker did not fulfill the safety guidelines; the damage could have been avoided (high controllability); (b) the tanker did fulfill the safety guidelines; the damage could not have been avoided (low controllability). It turned out that the more controllable the event the more angry people were and, important for our discussion, the more willing to participate in a boycott (Nerb & Spada, 2001). However, if the participants were to believe that the damage could not have been avoided, they were sad, which did not translate into action preparedness. 
Group-based appraisal theories of emotions. Appraisal theory was developed to explain personal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, “the self” implicated in emotion-relevant appraisals is clearly not only a personal or individual self. If group membership becomes part of the self, events that harm or favor an in-group by definition harm or favor the self, and the self might thus experience affect and emotions on behalf of the in-group. With such considerations in mind Smith (1993) developed a model of intergroup emotions that was predicated on social identification with the group. Since collective action is by definition a group phenomenon and group identification appears to be an important factor in determining collective action we will elaborate on the possible implications of group-based emotions on protest behavior. 
	The main postulate of intergroup emotion theory (as spelled out by Smith in 1993) is that when a social identity is salient, situations are appraised in terms of their consequences for the in-group, eliciting specific intergroup emotions and behavioral intentions. In three studies Mackie, Devos and Smith (2000) tested this idea. Participants’ group memberships were made salient and the collective support apparently enjoyed by the ingroup was measured or manipulated. The authors then measured anger and fear (Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (Study 3), as well as the desire to move against or away from the out-group. Participants who perceived the in-group as strong were more likely to experience anger toward the outgroup and to desire to take action against it. Participants who perceived the ingroup as weak on the other hand, were more likely to experience fear and to move away from the outgroup. The effects of perceived ingroup strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger. Results of these three studies confirm that when a social identity is salient, appraisals of events in terms of consequences for the salient ingroup lead to specific emotional responses and action tendencies towards the outgroup.
	Smith and colleagues investigated the salience of an identity predicting social emotions. Recently we see studies addressing the role of social identification in a more explicit way (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). These scholars argue that “people can, under certain conditions, be connected to others in such a way that they are likely to experience emotions even though they themselves are not directly confronted with the triggering situation” (p. 535), in their words: “I feel for us” (p. 533). 
These studies suggest that the same emotion processes (i.e. appraisals, emotions and action tendencies) operating at the individual level and in interpersonal situations operate in intergroup situations. Moreover, people do experience emotions on behalf of their group membership. Since intergroup emotion theory is based on the presumption that the group is incorporated in the self (“the group is in me”, thus “I feel for us”) one would assume that the more the group is in me (i.e. the higher the group identification) the more people experience group-based emotions. Yzerbyt et al. (2003) showed that indeed emotional reactions fully mediated the impact of categorization context and identification on action tendencies. In other words, the salience of similarity was found to generate angry feelings among participants only to the extent that they strongly identified with the relevant category. Thus people will experience group-based emotions when the social category is salient and they identify with the group at stake. 

Emotions: where do we stand and how to proceed
This brief overview suffices to demonstrate that emotions matter. They warn people of threats and challenges and propel (collective) behavior. Indeed, demands for change begins with discontent. Moreover, affective measures, such as affective commitment (Ellemers, 1993) and affective injustice (Smith & Ortiz, 2002; van Zomeren et al., 2006) have the largest impact on someone’s (collective) behavior. As mentioned previously, phenomena such as moral shocks (Jasper, 1997) or suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh, 1981) are primarily approached from a cognitive point of view. Few researchers paid attention to the complex emotional processes that channel fear and anger into moral indignation and political activity. 
Although emotion terms abound, so far, injustice is mainly approached from a cognitive point of view. Fortunately, the growing attention for emotions in social psychological research also affected injustice scholars (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Olson & Hafer, 1994; Scher & Heise, 1993). It is also clear that further investigation of the nature of the justice motive is needed (van Zomeren, 2006). Of particular importance is an understanding of the psychological processes underlying various forms of justice, since recent studies suggest that these processes may differ (Tyler, 1994). There may very well be other, neglected, aspects of justice to be explored. One suggestion flowing from both general social psychology and the specific literature on retributive justice is that affective models need to receive greater attention. 
In the social psychological approaches of emotions anger is seen as the prototypical protest emotion. For those of us who have been part of protest events or watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of protest detached from anger. But other emotions may be relevant in stimulating protest participation. Indignation is one of those emotions that “puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson, 1992: 32) and, therefore, stimulates protest participation. Ekman (1993) defines indignation as anger about the mistreatment of someone or something; this makes indignation the most political of feelings (Reichenbach, 2000). Indeed, the role of indignation in stimulating protest behaviour deserves it to be investigated (see Jasper, 1997; 1998; Kim, 2002; Reichenbach, 2000).
Another important matter concerns the possibility to do something about goal obstructions. Research suggests that emotions result not only from the appraisal of the implications of an event for goals of the individual but also from his or her ability to cope with the consequences of the event (Scherer & Zentner, 2001). Thus, strong political efficacy seems to elicit anger, while weak political efficacy elicits sadness (conform the argument of Scherer & Zentner, 2001). Further research is needed to shed light on this.
	In closing this section we want to allude to two new potentially interesting directions research is taking. Rahn (2004) has argued that people also experience mood as a result of group-membership. This so-called public mood “provides feedback to people about how the group (i.e., the political community) is faring”. Research has demonstrated that people in a positive mood display more self-efficacy, are more optimistic, and show more associative cognitive processes, while a negative mood, on the other hand, is related to higher risk perception, pessimism, and more rule-based cognitive processes (Forgas, 2001). In other words, the “emotional barometer” in a country might trigger different (risk) perceptions, cognitive styles and emotions. This suggests that public mood might influence the claims social movement organizations make, the way problems are framed, the emotions that are experienced and the motivations to participate in collective action.
Finally, recent work has explored to what extent coping activates certain brain areas known to be related to the aforementioned behavioral inhibition system and the behavioral activation system (BIS/BAS). In a recent study by (Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003) participants were led to believe that the research concerned reactions to radio broadcasts. Evaluative responses to the broadcast were assessed and brain activity was measured (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003). The participants (all college students) were led to believe that a tuition increase was either certain or merely under consideration. The researchers found that when conflict was less pronounced and action is possible (i.e., when tuition increase is merely planned and petitions are being handed out), greater relative left frontal activation is to be observed than in a situation where conflict cannot be resolved and action is impossible (i.e., when tuition increase is certain). Furthermore, among those who thought that the increase was merely under consideration, relative left frontal activity predicted both self-reported anger in response to the tuition increase message and coping behavior (signing and taking petitions). Thus, the possibility to act to ameliorate a situation activated the behavioral activation system resulting in anger and collective action behavior, whereas a seemingly unsolvable problem activated the behavioral inhibition system resulting in withdrawal (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003). 

Consciousness: the interlock between individual and context
We proposed that the social psychological concepts identification, emotions, cognitions and motivation mediate between two collective phenomena: collective identity and collective action. Obviously, in practice all these concepts are interwoven but, as we argued, the distinction is analytically useful. For example, several previously mentioned strands of research show that social identity and emotions seem to work in concert (e.g. Dumont et al., 2003; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993) and the same appears for social identity and cognitions (e.g. Swaab et al., in press). Emotions and cognitions also work together in explaining collective action participation. Originally relative deprivation theory proposed that collective actions are propelled by profound justice-related emotions. However, empirical work in the 1980s and the 1990s began to focus more on people’s perceptions or cognitive interpretations of inequality. Yet, in line with the traditional assumptions of RDT, studies found that although cognitions of group-based deprivation did predict collective action, justice-related emotions of deprivation such as dissatisfaction, resentment and group-based anger were a more powerful motivator for action, both empirically (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983) as well as meta-analytically (Smith & Ortiz, 2002; van Zomeren et al., 2006). 
Thus social psychological research reveals that at least the combination of identity/emotions, identity/cognitions and cognitions/emotions work together to motivate collective action. But how do these concepts act together in concert such that they all create a nutritious breeding ground for motivation to engage in collective action? In other words, how do group affiliation, the meaning and related feelings that individuals give to a social situation become a shared definition implying collective action? 
Following for example Gamson (1992), Foster and Matheson (1999) and Duncan (1999) we propose consciousness as a concept that connects individual and collective processes so that individual processes as identification, cognition and emotion all synthesize into a motivational constellation preparing people for action.​[2]​. Political consciousness generally represents a shift from a victim perspective, through which people accept their status, to a sense of discontent and withdrawal of legitimacy from the present social or political situation. Consciousness is defined as politicized identification―that is an identification with a category coupled with a collective political ideology around issues concerning that category (Duncan, 1999). This definition is based on stratum consciousness (Gurin et al., 1980), which involves four independent elements: (1) a sense that one’s fate is linked to that of other members of a group or category (gays, farmers, women, blacks), (2) discontent with the power and influence of the group, (3) a belief that power differentials are a result of structural rather than individuals factors, and (4) a collective orientation towards redressing these inequities. Hence, consciousness involves a mesh between individual and cultural levels (Morris, 1992: 55) or between individual beliefs about the social world and cultural belief systems and ideologies. 
Meaning structures at the individual level can be investigated with concepts such as heuristics, prototype, scripts or event schemas and (justice)schemata and the meaning structures of the collective level can be examined with concepts such as beliefs, symbols, ideologies and rituals. Of course, we can learn something of value from work that focuses on a single level, but “neither is adequate by itself if we want to understand the kind of political consciousness that affects people’s willingness to be quiescent or to engage in collective action” (Morris, 1992: 65). Taken alone, both the individual level approaches and the collective level approaches seem incomplete. As Gamson (1992, p.67) puts it: “students of social movements need a social psychology that treats consciousness as the interplay between two levels―between individuals who operate actively in the construction of meaning and socio-cultural processes that offer meanings that are frequently contested”. He argues that the concept of framing offers the most useful way of bridging these levels of analysis (Benford & Snow, 2000; de Weerd, 1999; Gamson, 1992; Hercus, 1999; Snow & Benford, 1992).

From collective identity to politicized collective identity
Awareness of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identity must politicize to become the engine of collective action. Politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment. Typically, this process begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group’s predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public, collective identity fully politicizes (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). 
What distinguishes politicized collective identity from collective identity? The first distinction is raised consciousness: “the growing awareness of shared grievances and a clearer idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances reflect a distinct cognitive elaboration of one’s worldview providing group members with a meaningful perspective on the social world and their place in it” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001: 327). The second distinction is about the relation with other groups. A politicized identity provides antagonistic lenses through which the social world is interpreted. This intergroup polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as ‘pro’ or ‘con’, thus as allies or opponents. The third distinction concerns the unique behavioral consequences of politicized collective identity, namely, politicized group members should be likely to engage in collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides. 

Consciousness: where do we stand and how to proceed
Although Gurin came up with the concept of consciousness as an important prerequisite of collective action three decennia ago, not much collective action researchers took up this idea (for exceptions see Duncan, 1999, Gamson, 1992 and Morris, 1992). A focus on consciousness might shed a light on what connects cognitions, emotions and motivation. Indeed, the politicization of both individual social and collective identities can be seen as a spiral process of consciousness raising by interpretation and reinterpretation in which cognitions and emotions all will act in concert to reinterpret social and political situations aimed at redressing a perceived social or political injustice. Hence, the politicisation of both collective and individual identities can be seen as a dynamic interwoven process in which the individual-based consciousness described by Gamson (1992) interacts with the more collectively-based consciousness mentioned by Morris (1992).
However, little is known about the dynamic processes of politicization of the collective identity and how this may change the content of the social identities. Another related identity issue is causality, for example, it seems plausible that people with a stronger politicized identity are more inclined to join a social movement and accordingly have strong action preparedness. Indeed, the (causal) dynamic relation between collective identities and politicized identities is under explored and deserves attention.
And how may this relate to group identification and politicization of that identity? The findings in classic and recent research indicate that people who identify with a group (1) perceive themselves to be more similar to each other (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Mackie, 1986); (2) are more likely to act cooperatively (Back, 1951); (3) feel a stronger need to agree with group opinion (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; Wilder, 1990); (4) perceive ingroup messages to be of higher quality (Brock, 1965; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990); and (5) conform more in both behaviour and attitude (French & Raven, 1959; Wilder & Shapiro, 1984); even more strongly in time of intergroup conflict due to polarization of group attitudes and behaviour (Mackie, 1986). This is exactly what Oegema (1993) shows in his study on the peace movement in the Netherlands, in times of intergroup conflict (when the Dutch government decided to deploy the cruise missiles) cognitive consistency proved to increase. 

Motivation
Demands for change are rooted in a notion of belonging (identification), and an experienced grievance (cognition) in combination with feelings related to this (collective) grievance. Consciousness-raising turns an individual experienced grievance into a collective grievance. Consciousness generally includes an action orientation: “the view that collective action is the best means to realize the group’s interests” (Gurin et al., 1980: 31). Hence, it includes the motivation to solve collective grievances with collective action. This brings us to our last proposed social psychological concept mediating between collective identity and collective action: motivation.
Motivation is the desire to achieve a goal, combined with the energy to work towards that goal. What motives do people have for taking part in collective action? So far, social psychologists, have proposed three participation motives: instrumentality, identity and group-based anger. We feel, however, that an important element is missing here, namely ideology (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Dijk, 2007a). The triad of instrumentality, identity, and ideology has a long history in functional theories of attitudes and behavior (Sears & Funk, 1991; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979) and related triads have been proposed in the literature as antecedents of attitude importance (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995) and cooperative behavior (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Therefore, we propose to add ideology as a fourth motive to participate in social movements. In the sections to come we will elaborate on these four motives.

Instrumental motives
Instrumentality became the focus of the literature on movement participation when resource mobilization and political process theory became the dominant paradigm of the field. It was emphasized that movement participation is as rational or irrational as any other behavior. Movement participants were seen as people, who belief that a situation can be changed at affordable costs. In other words, movement participation is seen as a rational choice following from the expectation that protest will yield certain outcomes and the value of those outcomes. 
The instrumental motive is theoretically rooted in Klandermans’s (1984) social psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory. Klandermans noted that resource mobilization theory had nearly abandoned the social-psychological level of analysis of collective actions and underestimated the significance of grievances and ideology as determinants of participation in collective actions (Klandermans, 1984: 584). He argued, furthermore, that in their decision to participate in collective action, people take reactions of others into account; indeed, costs and benefits of participation are not assessed in a social vacuum. To cure these flaws, Klandermans (1984) presented a social-psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory as explanation of why some aggrieved people participate in protest, while others do not. 
The model he proposes is a fusion of expectancy value theory and collective action theory. Expectancy value theory explains the motivation for specific behavior by the value of the expected outcomes of that behavior (Klandermans, 1984). The core of the social-psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory is the individual’s expectation that specific outcomes will materialize multiplied by the value of those outcomes for the individual. In line with expectancy-value approaches (Feather & Newton, 1982) expectations and values stand in a multiplicative relationship. A goal might be valuable, if it cannot be reached, it is unlikely to motivate behavior. If, on the other hand, a goal is within someone’s reach, but it is of no value, it will not motivate behavior either.
Expectancy-value theory, thus assumes a rational decision maker. However, collective action theory (Olson, 1965) maintains that rational decision makers if they must decide to take part in collective action are faced with a dilemma, the collective action dilemma. Collective actions, if they succeed, tend to produce collective goods that are supplied to everybody irrespective of whether people have participated in the production of the collective good. Thus, if the collective good is produced people will reap the benefits anyway. Collective action theory predicts that under those circumstances rational actors will choose to take a free ride, unless selective incentives (i.e., those incentives that depend upon participation) motivate them to participate. However, if too many people conclude from that assessment that they can afford to take a free ride, the collective good will not be produced. 
Klandermans (1984) argued that information about the behavior of others can help to overcome the dilemma. However, when the decision to participate must be taken it is usually not known what the others will do (but see Zhao, 1998 for an interesting example of a mobilization campaign where people did have information about the behavior of others). In the absence of factual information people must rely on expectations about the behavior of others. Such expectations can be based on past experience, interaction between potential participants, newspaper accounts, and so on. This is walking a thin line. If someone expects that few will participate his motivation to take part will be low. If someone feel that many people participate he may conclude that he can afford to take a free ride. Organizers will, therefore, try to make people belief that their participation does make a difference.
The model Klandermans built on the basis of these considerations, therefore, contained expectations about the behavior of others. Collective action participation is explained by the following parameters: collective benefits and social and non-social selective incentives. Collective benefits are a composite of the value of the action goal and the expectation that the goal will be reached. This expectation is broken down into expectations about the behaviors of others, expectations that the action goal will be reached if many others participate and the expectation that one’s own participation will increase the likelihood of success. 
Combining collective action theory with expectancy value models appeared to be a fruitful approach for a systematic analysis of the variety of beliefs, expectations and attitudes that are involved in the decision to take part in collective action (Klandermans, 1984). However, others have doubted whether movement participation could be fully explained by such rational considerations (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 2003, 2004; Schrager, 1985b). Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) argue that the assumption of rationality is especially strained in cases of protracted disputes. In these cases, activists often bear the financial and social burden of extreme hardship and are usually fully cognizant of the fact that benefits, if gained at all, may be slight. A major limitation of this account is its neglect of the social and ideological aspects of collective action. As Schrager (1985a: 859) points out, “collective action is more than the sum of economistic calculations: social and ideological factors figure powerfully in people’s willingness to act”.
Simon and colleagues observed that the instrumental approach proposed by Klandermans (1984) ignores the fact that people’s decisions are influenced by their membership of groups and inter-group dynamics (Gamson, 1992; Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2004b). As a result, it misses key factors encountered in social movement contexts. Understanding the influence of group membership on participation requires a broader perspective, one that goes beyond individualistic analyses and takes the relationship between the individual and the group into account (Haslam, 2001; Simon et al., 1998). Identity theories offer such a perspective.

Identity motives
The basic hypothesis regarding the identity motive is fairly straightforward: a strong identification with a group makes participation in collective political action on behalf of that group more likely (see Huddy, 2003; Simon, 2004; Stryker, Owens, & White, 2000 for a comprehensive treatment of the subject). As mentioned in the identification section, the available empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports this assumption. 
Identity motives refer to the circumstance that people identify with the others involved. For people taking the identity path to collective action participation, the focus changes from what “I” want to what “we” want (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Collective action participation is seen as a way to show who “we” are and what “we” stand for. Moreover, group members have the idea that “we” have much in common (by way of shared grievances, aims, values or goals). This participation motive is theoretically rooted in the identity pathway to collective action proposed by Simon et al. (1998).
Simon and colleagues (1998) proposed a dual path model to collective action participation in which they distinguished between an instrumental pathway, guided by calculative reasoning that concentrates on the costs and benefits of participation and an identity pathway guided by processes of identification. Two levels of identification were measured. The first concerned the broader social category from which a social movement typically recruits its supporters, the second the specific social movement organizations themselves. It was expected that identification with the social movement organization would be a better predictor than identification with the broader social category. This should be the case because the former is more directly tied to activist identity, which implies a readiness to act (Kelly, 1993).
In a series of studies Simon and his colleagues assessed the influence of identification on collective action participation net of instrumental motives. The studies clearly confirmed the hypothesized role of both instrumental and identity motives (Simon et al. 1998). Moreover, identification with the social movement (the German Grey Panthers, the gay movement or the fat acceptance movement) appeared to be a better predictor of movement participation than identification with the broader recruitment category (old aged people, gays or fat people). These results underscore the importance of the more politicized form of collective identification with the social movement itself. They suggest that identification with a disadvantaged group increases group members’ willingness to participate in collective action only to the extent that it is transformed into a more politicized form of activist identification (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). 
Simon et al.’s research program has taught us a lot about the working of instrumental and identity motives. First of all, it showed that both instrumental and identity motives account independently for willingness to participate. Rather than replacing instrumentality as an explanatory paradigm, identity adds to the explanation as a second parameter. Next, the program revealed the importance of identity salience. Yet, although salience is an essential condition, it is not enough; it is salience combined with a strong group identification that turns individuals into committed group members. Third, Simon et al.’s research showed that in times of relative peace primarily those who are strongly identifying members of the social movement organizations are prepared to mobilize, whereas in more conflictual times those who identify with the broader category are also prepared to take the streets. 
Identity processes appear to have both indirect and direct effects on collective action participation (Stürmer, 2000, cited by Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000): direct effects because collective identity creates a shortcut to participation: participation stems not so much from the outcomes associated with participation but from identification and solidarity with other group members involved (Klandermans, 2000); indirect effects because collective identity influences instrumental reasoning; it makes it less attractive to take a free ride: high levels of group identification increase the costs of defection and the benefits of cooperation. Moreover, if people identify more with their group, their grievances are stronger (Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Tropp & Wright, 1999), instrumental reasoning becomes more influential (McCoy & Major, 2003), threats to values are felt stronger (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), as are emotions (Yzerbyt et al., 2003), and they believe more in the collective efficacy of their group to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments, Kelly, 1993).

Group-based anger motives
Sociologists of emotions were the first to discuss the emotional aspects of collective action, but students of emotions in social psychology followed suit. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) proposed an emotional pathway to collective action next to the instrumental pathway; hence they also propose the notion of a dual pathway in their approach to collective action participation. Central in the model are so called group-based appraisals. 
They took the appraisal theory of emotion (Lazarus, 1991) as their point of departure. This theory conceives of appraisal, emotion, and action as the means by which people cope with events in their social world. It makes a distinction between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping. According to Lazarus (2001, p.48) a person engages in problem-focused coping when he “obtains information on which to act and mobilizes actions for the purpose of changing the reality”, while “the emotion-focused function is aimed at regulating the emotions tied to the situation.” Following Smith (1993), van Zomeren et al. (2004) propose an extrapolation of the appraisal theory of emotion to the group level. They argue that group members who perceive disadvantages as collective appraise events in group rather than individual terms. They relate problem-focused coping to the instrumental pathway to collective action and emotion-focused coping to the emotional pathway, the so-called group-based anger pathway. 
On the instrumental pathway group efficacy and action support play a central role. Group efficacy is the belief that group-related problems can be solved by collective efforts. When people take the instrumental path to political protest, they participate “for the purpose of changing reality” (Lazarus, 1991: 48). Collective action is seen as an instrumental strategy to improve the situation of the group. Action support implies the perceived willingness of other group members to engage in collective action. That, hence, increases a sense of efficacy.
In the group-based anger pathway unfairness and social opinion support play a central role. In line with social psychological grievance literature, van Zomeren et al. hold that it are more often procedures deemed unfair, than outcomes deemed unfair that upset people. In addition to perceived procedural unfairness, social opinion support is proposed as a mechanism that helps to define the experienced unfairness as shared. Social opinion support refers to the perception that fellow group members share the experienced unfairness. Appraisals such as unfairness and social opinion support are believed to promote collective action because they evoke emotions such as anger. Action participation allows people to regulate their emotions through action, which makes participating in collective action with a group-based anger motive a goal in itself.
Van Zomeren and colleagues tested their model in three experiments. They predicted and found that, when a group is collectively disadvantaged (which makes salient individuals’ social identity) (1) group-based appraisals of procedural unfairness and social opinion support promote collective action tendencies through group-based anger (so-called “emotion-focused coping”), and (2) group-based appraisal of social action promotes collective action tendencies through group efficacy (so-called “problem-focused coping”). Moreover, (3) because people can use both ways of coping both group-based anger and group efficacy independently predict collective action tendencies (i.e. the dual pathway model to protest).
Van Zomeren et al.’s (2004) study confirms the importance of emotions as motivators without replacing the instrumental pathway. Indeed, both pathways go together and reinforce one another and are conceptualized as equally rational ways of coping with collective disadvantage. However, besides emotional coping (i.e. emotion regulation) we want to emphasize another function for how emotions impact on protest behavior. We hold that emotions function as accelerators or amplifiers. Accelerators make something move faster, and amplifiers make something sound louder. In the world of protest accelerating means that due to emotions motives to enter, stay or leave a social movement translate into action faster, while amplifying means that these motives are stronger.
The importance of these concepts in explaining protest participation is also demonstrated in a meta-analysis (van Zomeren et al., 2006). The authors conducted a meta-analysis of 172 independent studies. Three areas of subjective perception are deduced from the social psychological literature on protest: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy, and a sense of social identity (see Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; van Zomeren et al., 2004). At least three important conclusions can be drawn from this meta-analysis. First of all; a sense of injustice, efficacy and identity each has an independent, unique effect on collective action. Second, politicized measures of identity resulted in stronger effect sizes than non-politicized measures (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a). The third conclusion is that the affective component of injustice is more predictive of collective action than the cognitive component of injustice. This relates to another important development in the social psychological injustice and relative deprivation literature that shows exactly the same, namely, that emotions play a crucial role in predicting collective action participation.

Ideology motives
The fourth motive, wanting to express one’s views refers at the same time to a longstanding theme in the social movement literature and to a recent development. In classic studies of social movements the distinction was made between instrumental and expressive movements or protest (see Gusfield, 1963; Searles & Williams, 1962). In those days, instrumental movements were seen as movements that aimed at some external goal, for example, the implementation of citizenship rights. Expressive movements, on the other hand, were seen as a goal in itself, for example, the expression of anger in response to experienced injustice. Movement scholars felt increasingly uncomfortable with the distinction, because it was thought that most movements had both instrumental and expressive aspects and that the emphasis on the two could change over time. Therefore, the distinction lost its use. 
Recently, however, the idea that people might participate in movements to express their views has received anew attention. This time from movement scholars who were unhappy with the overly structural approach of resource mobilization and political process theory. These scholars put an emphasis on such aspects as the creative and cultural aspects of social movements, narratives, emotions, and moral indignation (Goodwin et al., 2001; 2004). People are angry, develop feelings of moral indignation about some state of affairs or some government decision and they want to make that known. They participate in a social movement not necessarily to enforce political change, but to gain dignity and moral integrity in their lives through struggle and moral expression. 
The ideology path to protest participation refers to people’s values and the assessment that these values have been violated. A fundamental assumption on which this path relies is that people’s willingness to participate in political protest depends to a significant extent on their perception of a state of affairs as illegitimate (see van Zomeren et al., 2004), in the sense that it goes against fundamental values. An individual’s personal set of values is believed to strongly influence how, for example, a proposed policy, its ends and means, is perceived and evaluated. 
According to Rokeach (1973: 5), a “value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance”. For Schwartz (1992: 4), “values (1) are concepts of beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluations of behavior and events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance. Values, understood this way, differ from attitudes primarily in their generality or abstractness (feature 3) and in their hierarchical ordering by importance (feature 5)”. In principle, then, the distinction between attitudes and values is clear. “Attitudes refer to evaluations of specific objects while values are much more general standards used as basis for numerous specific evaluations across situations” (Feldman, 2003: 481). 
Conceptualized this way, values are matters about which people have strong feelings. They defend them and react strongly when their values are challenged (Feather & Newton, 1982). Indeed, “values are standards employed to tell us which beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions of others are worth challenging, protesting, and arguing about, or worth trying to influence or change” (Rokeach, 1973: 13). Participating in collective action is one of the possible reactions to a perceived violation of one’s values.

Motivational configurations 
We began our section on motives with a discussion of instrumental motives and within that context we referred to the debate about the free rider dilemma. Having discussed now the three other motives of participation we are in a position to reconcile the free rider debate. Within the instrumentality framework there are two ways to overcome the dilemma—selective incentives and optimistic but not too optimistic expectations about the behavior of others. The identity, ideology, and emotion framework implies additional ways to overcome the free riders dilemma. In all three frameworks the working of inner drives functions to neutralize the dilemma. In the case of identity, identification with others involved generates a felt inner obligation to behave as a ‘good’ group member (Stürmer et al., 2003). These authors show that, when self-definition changes from personal to social identity, the group norm of participation becomes salient; the more one identifies with the group, the more weight this group norm will carry and the more it will result in an “inner obligation” to participate on behalf of the group. Ideology motives create a sense of inner moral obligation for reasons of moral integrity maintenance. Maintaining one’s moral integrity incites an inner moral obligation to oneself, as compared to an inner social obligation to other group members incited by group identification. Group-based anger, finally, points to emotion regulation or catharsis as yet another mechanism to overcome free riding. After all, “the emotion-focused coping function is aimed at regulating the emotions tied to the situation” (Lazarus, 1991: 48), and one way to regulate these personally experienced emotions is to participate in collective action. Therefore emotional-focused coping makes free riding less likely, because one might take a free ride on the production of a collective good, but one cannot take a free ride on regulating one’s own personal emotions. The free rider literature tends to focus on external pull factors, such as goal achievement and selective benefits, but neglects the internal factors that push individuals toward participation.

Motivation: where do we stand and how to proceed
Research of the last two decennia has taught us a lot about the working of motivation. It showed that people have several motives to take part in collective action. It started of with instrumental motives followed by identity motives. Recently emotion regulation and ideological motives are added as reasons to take part. However, the current social psychological literature on protest participation has not elaborate on which of participation motives proposed so far will prevail for whom, when, and why. In other words, for whom will what pathway to collective action prevail, and why? Why are people attracted to one social movement organization rather than another? Why are some people inclined to take the instrumental path whereas others take the ideological path? More generally, the combined working of the motives to participate is far from clear, let alone the way the motivational configuration might differ for different movements, in different contexts, or at different times. We are currently in the process of writing down research in which we focus on various motivational constellations as a result of the mobilizing context (van Stekelenburg et al., 2007a; van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Dijk, 2007b, 2007c).
We also have pointed to the role of inner obligations. The social psychological importance of inner obligations is that one cannot take a free ride on inner obligations. This makes them important in the process of mobilization. But how such inner obligations are generated and how the various inner drives differ in their working or how they interact is not clear. Let alone, how they interact with group identification and consciousness-raising.
Instead of focusing on people who are motivated to participate, we might learn a lot from people who do not participate. Does the motivational constellation of non-participants differ from participants? And how about cognitions and experienced emotions? Is the consciousness of people who do not participate lower than that of people who do participate? All this kind of questions are interesting and can learn us a lot about why (or why not) people take onto the streets.

Collective action participation
In this section we will deal with the phenomenon of collective action participation. We will discuss such matters as what do we mean by movement participation; movement participation within the broader spectrum of the dynamics of contention; short-term versus sustained participation; and the dynamics of disengagement (an often forgotten aspect of movement participation).

The process of participation
Participation in social movements is a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, there are many different forms of movement participation. Two important dimensions to distinguish forms of participation are time and effort. Some forms of participation are limited in time or of a once-only kind and involve little effort or risk—giving money, signing a petition, or taking part in a peaceful demonstration. Examples in the literature are the demonstration and petition against cruise missiles in the Netherlands (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). Other forms of participation are also short-lived but involve considerable effort or risk—a sit-in, a site occupation or a strike. Participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer (McAdam, 1988) and participation in the Sanctuary movement (Nepstad & Smith, 1999) are cases in point. Participation can also be indefinite but little demanding—paying a membership fee to an organization or being on call for two nights a month. Pichardo, Almanzar, and Deane (1998) studied a variety of such forms of participation in the environmental movement. Finally, there are forms of participation that are both enduring and taxing like being a member on a committee or a volunteer in a movement organization. Examples are the members of neighborhood committees (Oliver, 1984) and the members of underground organizations (Della Porta, 1988, 1992). From a social psychological viewpoint taxonomies of participation are relevant because one may expect different forms of participation to involve different motivational dynamics. Let us give two illustrative examples. Long term, taxing forms of participation are typically of the kind that you need a few people for it who are willing to do the job. Once you have mobilized those few you do not really need more participants. Indeed, more participants might even create problems. This is typically the situation where people can and in fact do take a free ride (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Oliver (1984) shows that the few who participate in these activities are usually fully aware of the fact that they are giving a free ride to most sympathizers, but it doesn’t bother them. In fact, this is part of their motivation: if I do not do it nobody else will do it, they reason. Compare this to a strike. For a strike you need some minimal number of participants. As long as this threshold is not passed all effort is in vain. In terms of the motivation of participants, the problem to be solved is to make people believe that the threshold will be reached. 
	Knowing that you are giving many others a free ride, or knowing that a threshold must be reached are two completely different cognitions. The two examples illustrate that different forms of participation imply different motivational dynamics. More obvious is the impact of costs. Higher costs will reduce participation. This is indeed what we found in studies of two campaigns of the Dutch peace movement (Klandermans & Oegema 1987; Oegema & Klandermans 1994). Although the number of sympathizers at the two points in time was the same, as was the proportion of the sympathizers that was targeted by mobilization attempts, the campaign for the petition resulted in the participation of more than 50% of the sympathizers while that for a demonstration in not even 5%. In one of the rare comparative studies of types of movement participation Passy (2001) found indeed that the motivational dynamics of various forms of participation were different. 

Demand, supply, and mobilization 
Social psychology might be interested in individual level processes such as movement participation, this is not to say that the other disciplines have nothing to say about participation. In order to illustrate this it is important to understand that movement participation has a demand side and a supply side. Demand refers to the potential in a society for protest; it relates to the interest in a society in what a movement stands for. Is the movement addressing a problem people are worried about? Is there a need for a movement on these issues? Usually, the people who participate in a movement are only a small proportion of those who care about the issue. This is not necessarily a sign of weakness. On the contrary, for a movement to be viable, a large reservoir of sympathizers is needed to nourish its activists. Supply refers, on the other hand, to the opportunities staged by organizers to protest. It relates to the characteristics of the movement. Is it strong? Is it likely to achieve its goals at affordable costs? Does it have charismatic leaders? Is it an organization people can identify with? Does it stage activities that are appealing to people? Demand and supply do not automatically come together. In the market economy marketing is employed to make sure that the public is aware of a supply that might meet its demand. Mobilization is the marketing mechanism of the movement domain. 
	Empirical research into these aspects of the dynamics of participation addresses different phenomena. The demand-side of participation requires studies of such phenomena as socialization, grievance formation, causal attribution, emotions and (the formation of) collective identity. The study of the supply-side of participation concerns such matters as action repertoires, the effectiveness of social movements, the frames and ideologies movements stand for, and the constituents of identification they offer. The study of mobilization concerns such matters as the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication, the influence of social networks, the implied costs and benefits of participation and frame resonance. 
	Studies of participation tend to concentrate on mobilization and to neglect the development of demand and supply factors. Yet, there is no reason to take either for granted. To be sure, grievances abound in a society, but that does not mean that there is no reason to explain how grievances develop and how they are transformed into a demand for protest. Nor does the presence of social movement organizations in a society mean that there is no need to understand their formation and to investigate how they stage opportunities to protest and how these opportunities are seized by aggrieved people. 
	Between the social sciences a division of labor exists in terms of the study of demand, supply and mobilization. Social psychology is well equipped to study demand and mobilization, whereas sociology and political science typically study supply factors. The interplay of demand, supply, and mobilization leads to different configurations in different local and national settings. Therefore, comparative, preferable interdisciplinary, studies are the proper way of exploring demand, supply, and mobilization.

Demand
Our treatment of the dynamics of movement participation builds on the previously described three fundamental motives why movement participation is appealing to people: people may want to change their circumstances (instrumentality), they may want to act as members of their group (identity), or they may want to express their views and feelings (ideology). Indeed, we mentioned group-based anger motives too, but we take a slightly different approach to emotions than van Zomeren et al. (2004). We do not conceptualize group-based anger as a separate motive; we rather assume that there is no protest participation without emotions. Following Jasper (1997), we assume that emotions “give [all] ideas, ideologies, identities and even interests their power to motivate” (p. 127). Or, as we argued, emotions function as amplifier or accelerator for each of the three motives. Therefore we hold that instrumentality, identity and ideology (amplified by emotions) together account for most of the demand for collective political action in a society. 
	Social movements may supply the opportunity to fulfill these demands and the better they do, the more movement participation turns into a satisfying experience. In the section on the social psychology of movement participation we elaborated extensively on the demand side of the motives. In the current section we will briefly illustrate how movements shape the supply side of participation. 

Supply
Instrumentality. Instrumentality presupposes an effective movement that is able to enforce changes or at least to mobilize substantial support. Making an objective assessment of a movement’s impact is not easy (see Giugni, McAdam, & Tilly, 1999; Giugni, 1998) Giugni 2004, but of course movement organizations will try to convey the image of an effective political force. They can do so by pointing to the impact they have had in the past, or to the powerful allies they have. Of course, they may lack all this, but then, they might be able to show other signs of strength. A movement may command a large constituency as witnessed by turnout on demonstrations, or by membership figures, or large donations. It may comprise strong organizations with strong charismatic leaders who have gained respect, and so on. Instrumentality also implies the provision of selective incentives. The selective incentives of participation that can be made available may vary considerably between movement organizations. Such variation depends on the resources a movement organization has at its disposal (McCarthy & Zald, 1976; Oliver, 1980). 
Identity. Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one’s group. This is the most attractive if people identify strongly with their group. Movements and movement organizations may be, and in fact often are, controversial. Hence, becoming a participant in a movement organization does not mean taking a respected position upon oneself (Linden & Klandermans, 2006; 2007). Within the movement’s framework, this is, of course, completely different. There the militant does have the status society is denying him. And, of course, for an activist ingroup-outgroup dynamics may turn the movement organization or group into a far more attractive group than any other group ‘out there’ that is opposing the movement. Indeed, it is not uncommon for militants to refer to the movement organization as a second family; a substitute for the social and associative life society was no longer offering them (Orfali, 1990; Tristan, 1987). Movement organizations supply, make salient or even create sources of identification. Moreover, they offer all kinds of opportunities to enjoy and celebrate the collective identity: marches, rituals, songs, meetings, signs, symbols and common codes (see Stryker et al. 2000 for an overview). 
A complicating matter is the fact that people have multiple identities while movements tend to emphasize a single collective identity. This may imply competing loyalties as Oegema and Klandermans (1994) demonstrated with regard to the Dutch peace movement. The movement’s campaign against cruise missiles brought many a citizen, who sympathized with the movement but was affiliated the Christian Democratic Party that stood opposite the movement, under cross-pressure. Movement organizations can be more or less successful in coping with multiple identities. Kurtz (2002) describes how clerical workers of Columbia University struggled but succeeded to reconcile gender, ethnic, and class identities. Beckwith (1998), however, explains how women in the Pittston Coal Strike were denied the possibility to act on their gender identity. Very little systematic attention has been given in the social movement literature to the issue of multiple identity, yet it is to be assumed that every movement somehow must deal with the problem and depending on how this is accomplished is more or less attractive to various constituencies. 
	Ideology.  Social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between ‘critical communities’ where new ideas and values are developed and ‘social movements’ that are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. “In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames” (p. 31), Rochon argues. Social movement organizations, then, are carriers of meaning. Through processes such as consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1984), framing (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986) or dialogue (Steinberg, 1999) they seek to disseminate their definition of the situation to the public at large. Indeed, participating because of common interests or ideologies requires a shared interpretation of who should act, why and how. Movements affect such interpretations by the information they disseminate, a process known as framing (see Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; 1992). Gerhards and Rucht’s study (1992) of flyers produced by the various groups and organizations involved in the protests against the IMF and the World Bank in Berlin is an excellent example in this respect. These authors show how links are constructed between the ideological frame of the organizers of the demonstration and those of the participating organizations in order to create a shared definition of the situation. Such definitions of the situation have been labeled collective action frames (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997).
Social movements do not invent ideas from scratch, they build on an ideological heritage as they relate their claims to broader themes and values in society. In so doing they relate to societal debates that have a history of its own and that history is usually much longer than that of the movement itself. Gamson (1992), for example, refers to the ‘themes’ and ‘counterthemes’ that in his view exist in every society. One such pair of a theme and countertheme he mentions, is ‘self-reliance’ vs. ‘mutuality,’ that is the belief that individuals must take care of themselves vs. the belief that society is responsible for its less fortunate members. In a study of the protests about disability payment in the Netherlands we demonstrated how in the Netherlands these two beliefs became icons that galvanized the debates (Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996). While ‘self-reliance’ became the theme of those favouring restrictions in disability payment, ‘mutuality’ was the theme of those who defended the existing system. For decades Marxism has been such an ideological heritage from the past movements identified with, positively by embracing it or negatively by distancing themselves from it. In a similar vein, fascism and nazism form the ideological heritage rightwing extremism must comes to terms with either by identifying with it or by keeping it at a distance (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006).
Satisfying demand. Social movement organizations are more or less successful in satisfying demands for collective action participation and we may assume that movements that are successfully supplying what potential participants demand gain more support than movements that fail to do so. More specifically, movement organizations may gain support in case of a ‘fit’ between the fundamental reasons why people participate (more instrumental, identity of ideological reasons) and what social movement organizations have to offer, i.e. supply. Surprisingly, little systematic comparison of the characteristics of movements, movement organizations and campaigns in view of the supply side of participation can be found in the literature (but see Klandermans, 1993; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006).

Mobilization
When an individual participates in collective action staged by a social movement organization this is the result of a sometimes lengthy process of mobilization. Successful mobilization brings demand and supply together. Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several, conceptually distinct steps. Klandermans (1984) proposed to break the process of mobilization down into consensus and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization refers to dissemination of the views of the movement organization while action mobilization refers to the transformation of those who adopted the view of the movement into active participants. 






In our research on the mobilization campaign for a peace demonstration (Klandermans and Oegema 1987) we found that three quarters of the population of a small community south of Amsterdam felt sympathy for the movement’s cause. Of these sympathizers three quarters were somehow targeted by mobilization attempts. Of those targeted one sixth was motivated to participate in the demonstration. And finally, of those motivated one third ended up participating. The net result of these different steps is some (usually small) proportion of the general public that participates in collective action. With each step smaller or larger numbers drop out. The better the fit between demand and supply the smaller the number of dropouts. 

Sustained participation
Most research on collective action concerns a comparison of participants and non-participants in a specific instance of participation at a specific point in time—be it a demonstration, a boycott, a sit in, a rally, or a petition. In terms of our typology of forms of participation this concerns short term, most of the time low risk or little effort participation, sometimes high risk or effort. We argued that such short-term activities have different motivational dynamics than sustained participation, be it low or high risk or effort.
	Sustained participation is surprisingly absent in the social movement literature. Surprising, because long-term participants keep the movement sector going. A movement has only a limited number of core activists. For example, 5-10% of the membership of the Dutch labor unions are core activists (Klandermans & Visser, 1995; Nandram, 1995), while the Dutch peace movement at its heyday counted approximately 500 core groups with 15-20 members (Dirk Oegema, 1993). Empirical evidence suggests that most core activists are perfectly aware of the fact that they are giving 90% or more of the movement’s supporters a free ride, but do not care. On the contrary, this is what seems to motivate them to take the job (Klandermans and Visser 1995; Oliver 1984). They are the true believers who care so much for the movement’s cause that they are prepared to make that effort knowing that most others won’t. Indeed, Nandram (1995) found that for 29 % of the core activists within Dutch unions this was the single most important motivation for their participation.
	Sustained participation need not necessarily take the form of the same activity all the time. People often go from one activity to another sometimes even from one movement to another and in so doing build activist careers. 

The dynamics of sustained participation
Becoming a long term activist is to a large extent a matter of biographical availability. After all sustained participation requires discretionary time for an extended period. The concept of biographical availability was proposed by McAdam (1986) in his study of participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer. What McAdam had in mind was freedom from other societal commitments. “If college students are uniquely free of life-course impediments to activism, the Freedom Summer applicants were freer still. And the actual volunteers were the freest of all” (Goldstone & McAdam, 2001). Indeed, participants in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Campaign were students who were biographically available. But in terms of a life history there is more than available time, there is also mental availability, that is, a readiness for the ideas a movement is propagating. In trying to understand the interplay of socialization, long-term activism, and the social and political context, we propose to use the concepts of biographical continuity and conversion. 
Biographical continuity describes a life history whereby participation appears as the logical result of political socialization from someone’s youth onwards (Roth, 2003). Conversion, on the other hand, implies a break with the past. Critical events are supposed to play a crucial role in both situations (see also Blee, 2002). In the context of biographical continuity the event means the last push or pull in a direction in which the person is already going, whereas in the context of conversion the event means an experience that marks a change of mind. Obviously, such conversion does not come out of the blue. It is rooted in a growing dissatisfaction with life as it is. The critical event is the last push toward change. Teske (1997) describes the example of a journalist who ends up in front of the gate of a nuclear weapons plant and whose experience with the authorities suppressive response to that demonstration turns him into an activist. The story of this journalist made clear that on the one hand it was no accident that he ended up at that gate, but on the other hand had the demonstration not taken that dramatic turn it would not have had this impact on his life.
By way of illustration we will refer to life history interviews we conducted with extreme right activists (Klandermans and Mayer 2006). Three patterns of mobilization emerged from those interviews: one of continuity, one of conversion and one of compliance. The first pattern concerned interviewees who had always been interested in politics, some of them from very early on. Interestingly, all report that they have always been interested in rightwing politics. All but one were from a politically conservative milieu, the remaining interviewee was from a social democratic milieu. The converts had not been particularly interested in politics in the past, but later became involved in the extreme right. They can perhaps be best described as politically displaced persons, who found a new political home. They could no longer identify with the parties they voted for, or they felt that politics or the government was not addressing the real problems of society. In terms of their parental milieu no clear picture emerged. Some are from a social democratic background some from a conservative background. There seems to be a generational pattern here: the latter interviewees were from an older generation and became involved in politics later in their lives. Obviously, as they are the ones whose right wing activism is a matter of conversion. The former were from a younger generation and were attracted to politics on the extreme right from the very beginning. They seem to constitute some kind of ‘new right’ reacting to the new social movements of the eighties (see also Minkenberg 1998). This group’s political life history can be described in terms of biographical continuity that is at least the way they do it themselves. Compliants are people who were pulled into activism more or less despite themselves. Sometimes a partner, sometimes a friend or a brother asked them to assist or accompany them to a meeting and gradually they are becoming more involved in the extreme right. 

The dynamics of disengagement






Insufficient gratification in combination with declining commitment produces a growing intention to leave. Eventually, some critical event tips the balance and makes the person quit. Obviously, the event itself only triggers the final step. Against that background its impact may be overestimated. After all, it was the decline in gratification and commitment that causes defection; the critical event only precipitated matters. 
Insufficient gratification. In the previous sections we distinguished three fundamental motives to participate. On each of these motives a movement may fall short. Most likely it is for movements to fall short in terms of instrumentality. Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of social movements, it is obvious that many a movement goal is never reached. Opp (1988) has argued that indeed people are very well aware of the fact that movement goals are not always easy to achieve, but that they reason that nothing happens in any event if nobody participates. Yet, sooner or later some success must be achieved for the instrumentality motive to continue to fuel participation (M. Schwartz, 1976). In addition to not being achieved, movement goals may loose their attraction to people. They may loose their urgency and end lower at the societal agenda. Finally, the individual costs or risks of participation may be too high compared to the attraction of the movement’s goals. Repression adds to the costs and might make participation too costly for people (Tilly, 1978).
	Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one’s group. This is the most attractive if people identify strongly with their group. But the composition of a movement may change and as a consequence people may feel less akin to the others in the movement (Klandermans, 1994; Whittier, 1997). Indeed, Klandermans showed how activists from other movements flocked in increasing numbers into the Dutch peace movement, and thus estranged the original activist who had a church background. Schisms are another reason why movements fail to satisfy identity motives. Schisms are not uncommon in the social movement domain (Gamson, 1975). Sani and Reicher (1998) demonstrate that schisms result from fights over the core identity of a movement and that people who leave no longer feel that they can identify with the movement. Finally, people occupy a variety of positions in society. Each position is shared with other people and therefore comes with a (most of the time) latent collective identity. A change in context may make the one collective identity more and the others less salient and, therefore identification with a movement may wither. For example, in our study of farmers’ protest in the Netherlands and Spain, we observed that in Spain during a campaign for local and provincial elections the identification with farmers declined (Klandermans et al., 2002).
Social movements provide the opportunity to express one’s views. This is not to say that they are always equally successful in that regard. Obviously, there is not always full synchrony between a movement’s ideology and a person’s beliefs. Indeed, many a movement organization ends in fights between ideological factions and schisms and defection as a consequence (Gamson, 1975). 
Declining commitment. The concept of commitment roots in the fields of organizational psychology and the social psychology of union participation, where a lively debate on commitment has taken place over the last two decades (Goslinga, 2002). Movement commitment does not last by itself. It must be maintained via interaction with the movement and any measure that makes that interaction less gratifying helps to undermine commitment. Downton and Wehr (1991; 1997) discuss mechanisms of social bonding which movements apply to maintain commitment. Leadership, ideology, organization, rituals, and social relations, which make up a friendship network each contribute to sustaining commitment and the most effective is, of course, a combination of all five. 
	Although not all of them are equally well researched, each of these five mechanisms are known from the literature on union and movement participation as factors which foster people’s attachment to movements. For example, it is known from research on union participation that involving members in decision-making processes increases commitment to a union (Klandermans, 1986, 1992). For such different groups as the lesbian movement groups (Taylor & Whittier, 1995) and a group called Victims of Child Abuse Laws (Fine, 1995) it was demonstrated how rituals strengthen the membership's bond to the movement. Unions and other movement organizations have developed all kind of services for their members to make membership more attractive. Selective incentives may seldom be sufficient reasons to participate in a movement, but they do increase commitment. 
The role of precipitating events. When gratification falls short and commitment declines an intention to leave develops. Yet, this intention to leave does not necessarily turns into defection. Many participants maintain a marginal level of participation for extended periods until some event makes them quit. For example, Goslinga (2002) calculated that a stable 25 percent of the membership of Dutch labour unions considered leaving. As the event is the immediate cause of disengagement it draws disproportionate attention as explanation of exit behaviour, but note that the event only has this impact in the context of an already present readiness to leave. Such critical events can have many different appearances sometimes even appear trivial. When some decades ago Dutch labour unions changed to a different system of dues collection and members had to sign to agree with the new system quite a few members choose not to sign. Changing address may be seized as an opportunity to leave the movement simply by not renewing contacts in the new place of residence. More substantial reasons might be a conflict with others in the organization, disappointing experiences in the movement, a failed collective action, and so on. Such events function as the last drop that makes the cup run over.

Collective action participation: where do we stand and how to proceed
Movement participation is a phenomenon that has always intrigued social scientists. Why are people prepared to spend a lifetime as an activist and to sacrifice wealth, a pleasant and carefree life, or sometimes even their lives for a common cause? Why are at some points of time hundreds of thousands taking it to the streets, while at other moments mobilization fails? We have argued that participation is pre-eminently a topic of social psychology. In this section we have focused on the phenomenon of collective action participation and analyzed how it fits into the dynamics of contention. We have proposed that individual participation results from the successful interplay of demand factors, supply factors and mobilization. The more successful the three combine the more individuals will participate and the more sustainable participation will be. At the individual level mobilization is successful if people decide to participate. 
Admittedly, much of what is mentioned so far concerns the demand-side of participation. There remains a whole array of unanswered questions about how the demand-side of participation relates to the supply-side and how the two influence mobilization processes. One of the unsolved puzzles has to do with the role of the organizers of protest (Boekkooi, 2006). Obviously some people have to take the initiative to start organizing and mobilizing an event and thereby create the supply of collective action (Klandermans, 2003, 2004). How do they mobilize for an event and what choices do they make? And what is the role of negotiations in these mobilization processes? Importing the large (social psychological) literature on group dynamics and negotiations into the study of mobilization processes might be helpful. 

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTENTION: WHERE DO WE STAND AND HOW TO PROCEED
In the previous sections we have discussed group identification, cognition, emotions, and motivation as explanatory frameworks of collective action participation. Obviously, a comprehensive master frame that brings these elements together is still to be built. Yet, compared to 20 years ago the social psychology of protest has become richer, more sophisticated, and more rooted in state of the art social psychology. Students of social movements have for too long neglected social psychology. At the same time, social psychologists have for too long neglected to study such phenomena as social movements and collective action. As a consequence, social movement scholars are not aware of new developments in social psychology, while social psychologists are unaware of the many unanswered questions that they could help to find an answer to. We hope to have been able to build bridges between social psychology and the other social science disciplines. This is not to say that the social psychological approach to social movements is without any flaws. On the contrary, in the next and final section we will go into some of the limitations and challenges of a social psychological approach to social movement participation. 

Limitations of a social psychology of contention
The most obvious limitation of a social psychological approach to social movements and collective action lies in its level of analysis and its methodological individualism as already mentioned in the introductory section. Social psychology is good in explaining individual behavior but not in explaining the rise and fall or the success of failure of social movements. Because of its universalistic theories it also tends to be a-historical. Social psychological theories are not always good in taking the context of individual behavior into account and in theorizing about how contextual factors impact on social psychological mechanisms. Nonetheless, also collective phenomena such as social movements, political protest are composed of individual behavior. One may quarrel about the degrees of freedom individuals have when they chose to participate or not in protest activities, but in principle individuals do have a choice. 

Challenges of a social psychology of contention
We hope our ‘roadmap’ has been useful in exemplifying what social psychology has to offer to the study of social movements, where we stand and where we think the lacunas are. What are the challenges a social psychology of movement participation faces? We will mention a few and there might be more. Probably, the most important challenge is the integration of the proposed concepts. In that regard, moving from static to more dynamic explanations of protest participation is important. A more dynamic approach would provide the opportunity to study concepts like identification, participation motives, efficacy, emotions and feelings of injustice as consequence and antecedent of collective action. “From an investigational point of view, it is difficult to deal with a variable that, at the same time, can be a dependent and an independent variable, can develop over time or change across contexts” (Ellemers et al., 1999: 3). Yet, studying protest participation in a more dynamic way would do more justice to the theoretical and empirical richness of the concepts and may be crucial to gain better insights into the processes at hand. 
Little social-psychological research has focused on the subjective experience of more objective macro-level factors (Klandermans, 1997). This is not to say that social-psychological analyses of collective action should return to the “objective” social reality, but we think it is possible to identify variables at the meso- or macro level that are important in affecting peoples’ subjective interpretations of their collective disadvantages in terms for example of identities, opportunities or constraints and injustice. Recently, for example, it has been acknowledged that the dynamics of participation are created and limited by characteristics of the national contexts in which people are embedded (Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Roggeband, 2002, 2004). The key point is, that people still have to perceive characteristics of this context and translate it to their individual situation. 
Moreover, the relation between individual and collective processes explaining collective action is begging for exploration, be it socially shared cognitions, group-based emotions, idiosyncratic remake of collective identities or individual versus collective consciousness. How the individual and collective processes relate to each other is far from clear. Interdisciplinary approaches might be a good step in resolving these puzzles.
In sum, we see a future for a dynamic (interdisciplinary) social psychological approach to collective action exploring both individual as well as collective processes in social movement participation that goes beyond a static individual level of analysis.
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^1	  Social psychologists have not been the only ones who applied relative deprivation theory in the context of social movements. Political scientist used relative deprivation theory as well. The concept features prominently in the work of Gurr (1970, 1993). See Lupo and Meyer in this volume.
^2	  The concept of consciousness is related to Tajfel’s (1971) concept of social change orientation (solving group problems through group actions), in that it indicates the process of investing the self in the group and can be understood as a form of collective identity that underlies group members’ explicit motivations to engage in such a power struggle. The same process is recently referred to as politicized collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). And cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1982).
